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Abstract 
Urban regime theory maintains a privileged position of business power within governing coalitions. New 
institutionalism points to power asymmetries in the institutions and practices of governments and 
bureaucracies. Yet, it is precisely in this domain of urban governance where democratic innovations are 
presumed to hold their most radical potentials. In an effort to integrate advancements in urban research 
and democracy research, I propose democratic criteria for a global assessment of participatory 
governance arrangements (empowered advocacy, accountable administration). These arrangements are 
conceived as embedded in a broader democratic context, i.e. institutions of local government 
(accountable leadership, representation, self-rule, rule of law) and metropolitan governance (advocacy 
of affected localities, capacity for collective action). 
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1. Introduction 
Globally competing city regions are shaping the daily life of an increasing share of the world’s population. 
More than half of the world’s population depends on the economic opportunities offered in urban 
regions, while being affected by available housing, commuting ways, available means of public 
transportation, health and social services, schools and daycare structures, opportunities for leisure and 
socialization, and the quality of the environment. At the same time, it is in globally competing city 
regions that social and cultural differences are particularly pronounced and where the population size 
and complexity of governance at multiple levels make effective political involvement of all population 
groups seem unlikely. In fact, many people wonder whether their municipal and regional governments 
are actually responding to the needs of the broader population and not to the interests of particular 
segments of the population, business sectors and international investors.  
Skepticism towards representative governments is by no means limited to the urban scale but 
comprises also the more distant regional and national layers. As a general trend, while citizens in 
developed industrial democracies have remained supportive of the democratic ideal, they have also 
become ever more suspicious about their representatives and their political institutions – a combination 
that led to the expression of ‘critical citizens’ or ‘dissatisfied democrats’ (cf. Norris 1999). As these 
citizens have also become better educated, connected and informed as ever before, they are also 
pushing for more radical forms of citizen involvement in political decision making (Dalton 2004). Political 
elites, in turn, have responded to popular pressures by cautiously reforming disproportional electoral 
systems, strengthening judicial and administrative review, decentralizing the political system, and 
introducing more radical forms of citizen participation (Dalton 2004; Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003). 
Enthusiasts of participatory democracy often refer to Switzerland with its strong self-rule by means of 
direct legislation at all state levels (Barber 1984; Budge 1996; Kriesi 2005; Zittel and Fuchs 2007). 
Concurrently, governments in countries as diverse as Brazil, India, the United States and Canada are 
experimenting with deliberative citizen assemblies, new forms of community planning and the use of 
new social media (see e.g. Archon Fung and Wright 2003; Warren and Pearse 2008; G. Smith 2009).  
While such reforms may have the potential to radically transform the practice of democracy – 
particularly at the neighbourhood, municipal and regional level – their actual contribution to the quality 
of democracy is far from clear (Warren 2003; Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow 2003). Do they actually protect 
and empower affected population groups that have hitherto been marginalized? Are political leaders 
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and state officials actually being made more accountable and more responsive towards the broader 
population? In other words: is the quality of democracy really expanding? 
Even though democracy research has made considerable progress in developing empirical 
measures for differentiating degrees of democratic quality in advanced industrial democracies, most 
measures adhere to a minimalist conceptualization of representative democracy at the national level, 
basically accounting for freedom rights, separation of powers and competitive elections (Munck and 
Verkuilen 2002, 11; Pickel and Pickel 2006, 154). Newer measures now depart from broader grounds of 
democratic theory to include accounts of inclusion, public accountability, and direct participation (e.g. 
Diamond and Morlino 2005; Bühlmann et al. 2011). Inspired by this multidimensional approach, a similar 
measurement instrument has now been developed to measure the variation of democratic qualities in 
subnational political systems, namely for the half-direct democracies constituted by the Swiss regions 
(Dlabac and Schaub 2012). 
As we are interested in assessing the democratic qualities at the urban scale, it would be tempting to 
simply apply existing democracy measures to the local level. Yet the political processes and policy fields 
at the urban scale are quite distinct from the national and even regional political system. Distinct enough 
to have led to a sub-discipline of political science dedicated to the study of urban politics (John 2009). I 
believe that a framework for assessing urban democratic governance must be tailored to the 
particularities of the urban scale. In the next section I will therefore propose a layered framework of 
democratic criteria that apply to three levels of urban governance: Participatory governance, local 
government and metropolitan governance.  In section 3 I will summarize the comparative framework 
and its characteristics. The paper closes with a short outlook on how the comparative framework could 
be tested in a comparative case study in order to develop a consolidated measurement instrument that 
can be applied to a wide range of Western cities. 
2. Democracy in the Urban Space 
Urban research offers a rich background for tailoring a comparative framework for democratic 
governance at the urban scale. Community power theorists in the 1950s and 1960s have abandoned the 
previous static analysis of local government institutions, asking instead whether power is concentrated in 
elite networks or dispersed to a plurality of interest groups (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961). The call for 
community involvement, however, was most consequential within the field of urban planning, where 
many cities of the 1960s and 1970s introduced forms of public involvement, which have gradually 
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expanded beyond spatial planning to include strategic planning and effective service provision (Balducci 
and Calvaresi 2005). Yet another strain of urban research has argued that the analysis of urban 
governance must necessarily encompass the metropolitan scale, as the strong interdependencies of 
municipalities within city regions have made more or less formalized forms of regional governance 
factually indispensable (Savitch and Vogel 2000). 
While the analysis of urban governance has always been coupled with considerations on the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of urban governance, a more systematic attempt to assess the democratic 
legitimacy of urban governance across cities can be found in a European comparative research project 
(Haus, Heinelt, and Stewart 2005; Heinelt, Sweeting, and Getimis 2006). The research team explores how 
cities in different institutional settings and with different political cultures combine urban leadership and 
community involvement to produce more or less effective and legitimate outcomes. While basing their 
comparisons on elaborate empirical typologies of local government institutions, leadership styles and 
forms of community involvement, the actual evaluation of different forms of urban governance was 
confined to measures of urban sustainability and subjective assessments of legitimate policy-making. 
The normative framework developed here takes into account three central layers of urban 
governance that can be identified in urban research. At the heart of the framework are the evolving 
participatory governance arrangements, as they hold the potential of empowering advocates of 
marginalized population groups and making bureaucracies more accountable towards the broader 
public. These arrangements, however, do not exist in isolation and must be conceived as embedded in a 
broader democratic context, i.e. institutions of local government and metropolitan governance. Firstly, 
elected leaders and representatives will remain the central figures to be held responsible for their acts 
by the broader public. Even where decision power is delegated to community representatives, agenda 
setting, political communication and actual enforcement of the agreed policies remain highly dependent 
on democratically accountable urban leaders and political representatives. Secondly, the institutional 
design of metropolitan governance will determine whether population groups across the metropolitan 
region will engage in collaborative action or whether some localities will suffer from negative-sum 
rivalries and external costs caused by unilateral strategies pursued by other localities. Let us now 
consider the democratic potentials offered at these three governance levels one after another. 
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2.1. Governance-Driven Democratization: Empowered Advocacy and Accountable 
Administration 
Accounts of urban governance beyond city hall have typically been painted in dark colours. Taking a 
middle ground between elitist and pluralist theories of urban politics, urban regime theory focuses on 
informal governing coalitions forged by urban leaders and senior bureaucrats to include resourceful 
business elites and selected community representatives securing the necessary electoral support for 
pursuing a more or less progressive policy agenda (Stone 1989). Within such an urban regime no one 
would dispose of absolute power, but business power would certainly have a privileged position as 
financial assets could be most readily converted for achieving significant policy results. Depending on the 
composition of this government coalition certain population groups can be effectively excluded from 
power while marginal potential opposition groups may be bought in by small-scale material incentives. 
The formation of stable regime structures, however, is by no means certain, and while existing 
government coalitions in some cities may adapt to changing political circumstances, in other cities they 
may be effectively challenged by newly forming opposition groups and protest movements. 
In recent years, neo-institutionalism is gaining ground in urban research to complement the 
dominant approach of urban regime theory. In contrast to the discredited old institutionalism, new 
institutionalism accounts not only for formal institutions, but also for power asymmetries replicated by 
informal conventions and coalitions of governments and bureaucracies (Lowndes 2009). The old model 
of administrations being hierarchically controlled by electorally accountable governments seems no 
longer viable in a context of autonomous and closed governance networks that cannot longer be over 
sighed by the legislature, thus rendering public accountability a central challenge (Kjaer 2009). 
Administrative agencies and street-level bureaucrats are exposed not only to multiple hierarchical 
principles but they also develop informal ‘decision rules’ emerging from task performance as well as 
‘attention rules’ that might privilege certain neighbourhoods or citizen groups above others (Jones 1995, 
84–85). 
As scholarly attention has moved from the formal institutions of municipal government to the 
opaque and potentially exclusive character of bureaucratic practices, policy networks and government 
coalitions, we may contend with Mark Warren (2009) that the most radical potentials of democratization 
have also shifted from electoral democracy into democratic governance, the field of technocrats and 
administrators. We may, in fact, be witnesses of a trend that Warren eloquently calls ‘governance-driven 
democratization’. According to Warren (2009, 8), “elected governments have become increasingly aware 
that electoral legitimacy does not translate into policy-specific legitimacy.” Initiated from within 
5 
 
government and administration, new forms of democratic participation have emerged. These are not 
meant to replace other forms and spaces of democracy such as electoral democracy, social movements 
or deliberation through the media but might be supplementary to it (Warren 2009, 8). These new forms 
are not to be confused with direct participation in the form of direct legislation, they are often 
democratic experiments commonly engaging a relatively few citizens and rather have the potential to 
constitute a means of representation of the broader population. Warren proposes to critically assess the 
opportunities and dangers of governance-driven democratization as measured by the democratic values 
of inclusion of the affected, empowerment, representation, and deliberation.  
In a similar vein, Graham Smith (2009) develops a comparative framework that allows for the 
comparison of very different modes of citizen participation based on the “manner and extent to which 
they realize desirable qualities or goods that we expect of democratic institutions” (Smith 2009, 12). 
More specifically he compares participatory budgeting, deliberative citizen assemblies, direct legislation 
and e-democracy with regard to the ‘democratic goods’ of inclusiveness, popular control, considered 
judgment and transparency. Brigitte Geissel (2012), in turn, proposes to compare different forms of 
democratic innovations by their degree of inclusive equal participation, perceived legitimacy, and 
deliberative quality, but also by their impact on the citizens’ democratic skills (civic education) and on the 
actual achievement of collectively identified goals (effectiveness).  
An even more detailed account of single participatory processes all over the world is strived for 
by the Participedia project (A. Fung and Warren 2011). This open-source repository collects qualitative 
and quantitative data on institutional design and democratic outcomes of participatory processes in the 
whole range of possible policy fields. Design choices are categorized in order to capture the selection 
method of participants, the modes of communication and decision and the extent of authority and 
power assigned to exercises of public participation. With regard to democratic outcomes, contributors to 
the project are asked to assess a number of aspects: increased voice of those affected, increased relevant 
information, development of citizen capacities and organizational capacities, deliberative quality, and 
limited levels of corruption and undermining patronage systems. 
In contrast to the aforementioned proposals we do not intend to comparatively evaluate 
different forms or single instances of participatory processes. Rather, the aim is to assess the democratic 
quality of governance across cities. Our units of comparison are thus cities, and we are interested in a 
broader assessment of democratic qualities within that urban space. If we want to assess the level of 
governance-driven democratization, we need to make an overall evaluation of how existing participatory 
processes have led to particular democratic outcomes. In any case, these participatory processes must 
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be evaluated against the background of potential urban regimes, policy networks, administrative 
practices and protest politics that may have remained unaffected by the participatory processes at hand. 
More specifically, I propose to assess the level governance-driven democratization by two broad criteria 
of democratic outcomes: empowered advocacy and accountable administration. 
 
Empowered advocacy. Instead of relying on highly idealistic accounts of an equal voice to everyone 
affected, improved civic skills and the deliberative quality of decision, I believe that an overall 
assessment of democratic governance in the context of potentially exclusive policy networks, 
government coalitions and administrative practices requires a far more pragmatic conceptualization of 
empowerment and advocacy. Individuals pertaining to marginalized population groups typically play a 
minor or no role in these processes (Getimis, Heinelt, and Sweeting 2006, 13). All the more important is 
the involvement of representatives for all potentially affected population groups throughout the whole 
process of policy formation, decision making, implementation and monitoring. This requirement does 
not mean, however, that the final decisions and administrative acts must accommodate to the needs and 
desires of all affected population groups equally. Some people might be promoting more particularistic 
interests, while a decision made at the neighborhood or higher level might weight collective goals of 
other affected population groups more heavily. The balancing of narrow interests will depend on a 
power balance between involved representatives and the role of public officials and elected leaders in 
initiating governance processes, selecting participants, structuring interactions and considering 
conflicting goals and interests in their final decision making and implementation acts. 
Now, who are the representatives of potentially affected population groups to be considered for 
involvement? Again, my approach will deviate from the idea of selectively or randomly assigning citizens 
to represent citizens with similar characteristics. Particularly if participatory exercises are designed as 
purely consultative, its actual impact on decision making and implementation will depend on the 
involvement of organizations that dispose of a high capacity to mobilize their members and sympathizers 
in the case public officials should ignore their positions. Whereas unorganized citizens might be more 
susceptible to co-optation by more powerful interests, neighborhood organizations and advocacy groups 
at neighborhood or higher levels will usually make for a more empowered advocacy, provided they must 
not fear a shortage of public funds (see Archon Fung 2004, chap. 3.9, 7.3). In cases where resourceful 
groupings lobby against a broader cause, public officials and urban leaders will have to publicly justify 
their stance and convince the broader public of their reasoning. 
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Accountable administration. Independently of whether participatory processes succeed in securing 
empowered advocacy of all affected or not, practices of governance may also be democratized by 
exposing technocrats and administrators to public accountability (Getimis, Heinelt, and Sweeting 2006, 
16). Participatory processes may serve this goal by requiring public officials to present information and 
justify their stance towards participating publics. Depending on the relevance and publicity of 
governance processes, mass media may take interest and deliver a more or less differentiated media 
coverage, allowing for a broader public awareness and public accountability of ongoing governance 
processes. Even though public accountability does not include immediate sanctioning mechanisms, the 
mere need of public officials to listen to different needs and justify their stance to affected population 
groups may lead to adapting attitudes and innovative practices. Moreover, public officials are not 
immune to public pressure and might wish to avoid provoking public criticism that can be anticipated. 
2.2. Democratic Local Government: Accountable Leadership, Representation, Rule of Law, and 
Self-Rule 
Even if urban regime theory and the new institutionalism have focused on leadership, informal coalitions 
and administrative practices, scholars of urban politics have not neglected the importance of formal 
government institutions and local autonomy for framing these governance processes, particularly when 
theorizing in an international perspective (e.g. Wolman 1995; Goldsmith 1995; Bäck 2005). A typology 
which has been widely used in comparative local government studies was put forward by Hesse and 
Sharp (1991). The variation of local state traditions in western states can be appreciated in the extended 
typology by Loughlin and Peters (1997), as shown in table 1. 
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Table 1: State traditions 
 Anglo-Saxon French Germanic Scandinavian 
Is there a basis 
for the ‘State’ 
No Yes Yes Yes 
State-society 
relations 
Pluralistic Antagonistic Organicist Organicist 
Form of political 
organization 
Limited federalist Jacobin, ‘one and 
indivisible’ 
Integral/organic 
federalist 
Decentralized 
unitary 
Basis of Policy 
Style 
Incrementalist 
‘muddling 
through’ 
Legal 
technocratic 
Legal corporatist Consensual 
Form of 
decentralization 
‘State power’ 
(US); local 
government (UK) 
Regionalized 
unitary state 
Co-operative 
federalism 
Strong local 
autonomy 
Countries UK, US, CAN (but 
not Quebec), IRE 
FRA, ITA, SPA 
(until 1978), POR, 
Quebec, GRE, BEL 
(until 1988) 
GER, AUT, NET, 
SPA (after 1978, 
BEL (after 1988) 
SWE, NOR, DEN 
Source: Loughlin and Peters (1997, 46) 
 
Another perspective on local governments is proposed by Hendriks (2010) who adapts the highly 
influential democracy typology set forth by Lijphart (1999) to the local level, by identifying majoritarian 
and consensual characteristics of local governments (table 2). In the UK, the prototype of the 
majoritarian system, local governments continue to be dominated by majoritarianism, despite some 
recent efforts to introduce selective consensual traits (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lidström 2011, 717). The 
Rhinelandic countries in contrast dispose of a consensual pattern at the local level as well, although the 
federal state of Germany with its ‘two-and-a-half party system’ and strong directly elected mayors shows 
some elements of a majoritarian democracy (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lidström 2011, 720). The Nordic 
countries with their unitary welfare states lack the strong meso-level found in the Rhinelandic countries 
and disposes of a multi-party system that is often biased towards one or two dominant parties (Hendriks, 
Loughlin, and Lidström 2011, 721). The southern European states, finally, “share a history of strong 
centralization and concentration of political and administrative power”, with France, Greece, Portugal, 
and Malta still being dominated by the majoritarian model, notwithstanding the decentralization efforts 
in France since the 1980s (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lidström 2011, 722). 
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Table 2: Majoritarian and consensual characteristics of local governments 
 Majoritarian Consensual 
Party system Two-party system  Multiparty system  
Cabinet One-party with simple council 
majority  
Multiparty coalitions  
Government-council relations Executive dominance in 
monistic government  
Balanced relations in dualistic 
government  
Electoral system Majoritarian  Proportional  
Interest groups Pluralism  Local corporatism  
Division of local power Unitary, centralized  Multi-tier and multi-unit  
Division of regulatory power Concentration, vertical lines 
from committees to sectoral 
bureaucracies  
Dispersed, need for horizontal 
coordination of policy sectors  
Local autonomy Home rule, local autonomy  Institutionalized 
interdependency  
Legal-administrative 
supervision 
Limited  Oversight by external bodies  
Financial-economic auditing Under local political control  External ‘courts of audit’  
Source: Hendriks (2010, 55, 72-73) 
 
Although these accounts are illustrative of the large variation across local governments, our 
primary concern are not these institutions, but the democratic quality of urban governance taking place 
within that institutional context. The question is therefore, how well are different institutional designs 
suited to promote democratic outcomes? I will argue that the democratic outcomes to be considered 
within the realm of local government are: accountable leadership, inclusive representation, considered 
self-rule, and substantive rule of law. 
 
Accountable leadership. Given the modest resources commanded to local governmental authority in 
most countries, studies of urban governance have stressed the importance of urban political leadership 
for energetic governance (Stone 1995). Even though political leadership can be exercised by a variety of 
people across a city, most studies focus on those people at the top of the formal political institutions as 
this group “has influence over public resources and hence has accountability and power relations with all 
the citizens within the area” (Greasley and Stoker 2009). Key tasks of these political leaders are: 
maintaining political support, developing policy direction, representing and defending the authority’s 
goals in negotiations with other bodies, and ensuring task accomplishment (see Leach et al. 2005). 
Leader’s success to attain their goals has often been explained by contextual factors and personal skills 
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and capabilities, but also by the institutional structure in which they operate. In a comparative study of 
14 countries Mouritzen and Svara (2002) differentiated four ideal types of governmental forms. In strong 
mayor systems an elected mayor controls the majority of the city council and is responsible for all 
executive functions. In the committee-leader form the political leader is charged with some executive 
functions, but other functions are assigned to standing committees and to the top administrator (CEO, 
city manager, secrétaire générale or the like). In the collective form there is one elected collegiate body 
that is responsible for all executive functions, where the mayor presides the body. Finally, in the council-
manager form, all executive functions are in the hands of a city manager who is appointed by the city 
council, where the mayor is formally assigned presiding and ceremonial functions only. The authors note, 
however, that the governmental form does not automatically relate to a strong policy leadership. Instead 
they find that leaders in strong mayor and leader-committee forms are more likely to figure as party 
leaders bringing their party concerns into their role.  
In the earlier mentioned European comparative research project the evidence does not support 
the general hypothesis of enhanced leadership in systems with direct mayoral elections, consolidated 
party systems or strong parliamentary support. Instead it is particular leadership styles that are 
encouraged depending on the institutional and political context (Bäck 2006). The more fragmented the 
institutional and political landscape, the more likely are leadership styles that facilitate cooperation and 
consensus. Constitutional arrangements that vest the political leader with high degree of legitimacy 
through direct elections, in contrast, are favourable conditions for a visionary style, where a leader gains 
the support of different sides to promote innovative policies. However, the same constitutional feature 
may also encourage a city boss style, with the political leader promoting his agenda without anticipating 
capacity building in local or regional actors. 
Whereas strong policy leaders backed by their council might be desirable in terms of their 
achievements, a strong and visible leadership might also bolster the public accountability of urban 
politics. On the other hand, strong urban leaders must not always entertain active relationships of 
accountability with the broader public. Effective accountability requires that urban leaders listen to the 
needs of the urban population, inform about ongoing processes and give public justifications of their 
stance in controversial matters. A critical public debate is also conducive to an informed electoral 
debate, where elections represent a potential sanctioning mechanism for urban leaders and their 
supportive councillors. 
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Inclusive representation. While population groups should dispose of empowered advocacy in 
governance processes affecting their everyday life, their needs and wishes should also be forcefully 
represented at the level of local government. Representative councillors may initiate policies and 
projects that are vital to their constituents while also serving the broader population of the city. Just as 
well, representative councillors may effectively challenge some policies and developments favouring 
certain population groups at the expense of the majority of the population. 
Inclusive representation, however, has not everywhere been the primary concern when 
institutionalizing local government. Indeed, the variation in important institutional aspects noted earlier 
can be attributed to different fundamental values in different societies. For the case of the United States, 
Wolman (1995) identifies three such fundamental values: Participation, pluralism and representation, 
and economy and efficiency. Jefferson’s ‘sovereignty of the individual’ was the animating force behind 
the early American local government, which in New England took the form of town meetings but in other 
places also the use of local referenda and initiatives. In reaction to the Jeffersonian concern with 
participation the pluralist version of local democracy consists of conflict among diverse groups, which 
needs to be resolved by representative decision makers, combined with the checks and balances 
reflected in the separation of the executive (mayor) and legislative power (council). As a reaction to 
machine politics and corruption, the Progressive movement in the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
propagated the role of municipal government to be primarily that of the efficient delivery of local 
services. This led to the implementation of a council-manager form of government – where the manager 
is appointed by the council and is an expert on the efficient delivery of services – non-partisan elections 
and at-large rather than ward elections – to eliminate small area interests (Wolman 1995, 136–139). 
These latter efficiency-oriented government reforms in the United States have been critically 
debated (see Wolman 1995, 143-148). The reform movement has been accused of pursuing own 
economic interests against immigrant desires in the name of the general good. Moreover the reforms 
“were not neutral in terms of the values of pluralism and representative democracy” (Wolman 1995, 
145). At-large elections and non-partisan elections seem to reduce voter participation and 
representation of low-status groups. While upper-class groups retain a channel of expression through 
various civic organizations, the lower class has need for direct political representation. 
Wolman (1995) contrasts the American values and local government structure to Britain, where 
local government is primarily seen as a counterweight to national government and as a device for 
efficient and effective local service delivery. Responsiveness is brought about by representative 
democracy, where the electorate chooses a council in partisan elections. The council is organized into a 
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committee structure with the dominant party or coalition controlling each committee, the committees 
being responsible for a particular public service and its administration. It is notable that in the British 
local government there is no single locus of executive authority; executive authority is invested in the 
council as a whole. Unlike the United States, the critical assessment of governmental structures has 
centered more on efficiency than on representation and participation. 
 
Considered self-rule. The British and US-American values could also be contrasted with the case of 
Switzerland, where direct participation has certainly become a dominating feature. While town meetings 
similar to those in New England have an older tradition in rural communities, also cities with 
implemented parliament have in the late 19
th
 century introduced extensive rights of direct participation 
through initiatives and referenda (Bützer 2007, 34–43). In the early 20th century direct democratic 
instruments at the local level were adopted in some US-states and several Western European countries, 
and they were also adapted in several Eastern European countries after 1989 (Schiller 2011). In order to 
contribute to democratic urban governance, popular votes regarding important matters of people’s 
every-day life must be frequent and decisive. In order that the popular vote considers the needs of the 
community in general and of marginalized population groups in particular, a high and inclusive turnout is 
imperative. Considered self-rule also requires an engaged public debate preceding the vote, resulting in 
more sensible and better informed voters. 
 
Substantive rule of law. The expressed desirability of empowered advocacy, leadership and self-rule 
does not mean that there is no space for rule of law in democratic urban governance. Popular desires 
pushed forward by advocacy groups and urban leaders must not transgress the basic freedom rights, 
political rights or property rights of any individual. Legal standings, independent legal-administrative 
courts, judicial procedures, external ‘courts of financial audit’ and ombudsmen will contribute to the 
consideration of affected interests and of the environment, while alleviating arbitrary ruling and 
corruption by public officials. 
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2.3. Democratic Metropolitan Governance: Advocacy of Affected Localities, and Capacity for 
Collective Action  
The considerations so far have centred upon participatory governance processes and local government 
institutions within the bounds of a local political jurisdiction. The urban scale, however, usually expands 
beyond a single core municipality, and increasingly so with continuing population growth and urban 
sprawl. Urban dwellers commute across that shared urban space for work, social relations and 
environmental experience, utilize common infrastructure, and stand in dense economic relations with 
each other. In order to reflect this social and economic community and with the aim to deliver public 
services more efficiently, adherents of the metropolitan government school in the early and mid-20
th
 
century have called for the establishment of metropolitan governments either through annexation, city-
county consolidation or the establishment of a new metropolitan tier (e.g. Maxey 1922). In response to 
the supposedly inefficient and unresponsive service delivery by centralized bureaucracies, the public 
choice school from the 1950s onwards saw the fragmentation of local government as a virtue, as inter-
local competition for mobile taxpayers would lead to tax-service packages matching the local needs (e.g. 
Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961).  
Concerned by the neglect of questions of equity, scholars of new regionalism have since the 
1990s focused on forms of metropolitan governance that combine hierarchical forms of strategic 
decision making with horizontal cooperation and coordination (e.g. Rusk 1993; Savitch and Vogel 1996). 
However, the successes of the so called ‘governance without government’ in “reducing the growing 
urban-suburban disparities, enhancing regional growth policies to reduce sprawl, producing affordable 
housing in the suburbs, and leading to a more competitive city in the world economy” have been 
disappointing (Savitch and Vogel 2009, 114). Moreover, Neil Brenner (2002) argued that new regionalists 
missed the broader context of new regional dynamics. Instead of being experiments for strengthening 
local autonomy and ameliorating the urban crisis, new forms of regional governance would reflect a 
“postfordist urban restructuring and neoliberal (national and local) state retrenchment” (Brenner 2002, 
3). In his grand theory the rescaling and reterritorialisation of the city-region is seen as a part of a larger 
restructuring of statehood in response to the pressures of global capitalism (Brenner 2004). This brief 
sketch of different approaches to metropolitan governance, as well as the following overview table, is 
based on Savitch and Vogel (2009). 
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Table 3: Theoretical frameworks on regionalism 
 Metropolitan 
government 
(Old 
regionalism) 
Public 
choice  
(Poly-
centrism) 
New regionalism Rescaling and 
reterritorialisation 
Time-frame 1900-1960s 1950s-1990s 1990 to present 2006 to present 
Core focus Efficiency Effectiveness Equity City competitiveness 
Pattern of 
urban 
development 
Monocentric Multi-
centered but 
core still 
dominant 
Multi-centered but core 
less dominant 
Megalopolis 
Problem Fragmentation Centralisation Equity/competitiveness Competitiveness 
Solution Hierarchy: 
Establish 
metropolitan 
government 
Market: Tax 
competition, 
good public 
services, 
economic 
attractiveness 
Horizontal 
Cooperation: Strategic 
metropolitan decisions 
through consolidation 
or governance 
arrangements 
Rescaling/ 
Restructuring: 
realignment of 
boundaries, roles, 
functions, and 
resources and 
relations with private 
and non-
governmental actors 
Major 
critique 
May lead to 
lack of 
responsiveness, 
problem of 
minority 
dilution 
Lack of equity 
as poor can’t 
move easily 
Weak regionalism, 
unlikely to reduce 
disparities 
Tendency towards 
economic 
determinism, high 
level of abstraction, 
and ‘absence of 
politics’ 
Empirical 
reference 
points 
New York City 
(1898) 
Toronto (1954) 
Miami (1958) 
London (1965) 
Los Angeles 
(Lakewood 
Plan) 
St. Louis 
Pittsburgh 
Louisville (1986-2000) 
Bologna 
Rotterdam 
Portland 
World cities 
Source: Abbreviated version of Table in Savitch and Vogel (2009, 108–109) 
 
While most empirical studies of metropolitan governance have been concerned with questions 
of efficiency and equity, a newer branch of research has focused on the question of the democratic 
quality of metropolitan governance arrangements. An international research team around Heinelt and 
Kübler (2005) found that cities within Europe and North America have chosen different paths for building 
area-wide governance capacity in city regions, and that these paths were coupled with different 
democratic outcomes. Due to the high value assigned to local self-government, cities following the North 
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and Middle European state tradition were found to either rely on governance arrangements dominated 
by municipalities, or to establish new metropolitan governments, but either way democratic legitimation 
is achieved through traditional forms of democratic participation such as voting and participation. Cities 
of the Anglo Saxon tradition, with their low legal status, have been much more dependent on higher 
government interventions for building metropolitan governance capacity. In a context of new 
government organisations, quasi-governmental bodies and private actors, network-based governance is 
needed to pool the resources and competencies necessary for achieving particular policy objectives. 
Legitimation of these processes is therefore much more dependent on new forms of public involvement 
and on accountable leadership at the metropolitan scale. In cities within the French tradition of local 
government, public services have traditionally been managed at higher levels of government, while the 
function of local political leaders is to represent local interests against higher levels. Accordingly, the 
form and implementation of higher level initiatives for building metropolitan governance capacity were 
highly dependent on local political leadership. While cities in Greece and Spain seemed to be more keen 
towards achieving governability through ‘social dialogue’ as opposed to corporatist arrangements found 
in Northern and Middle European countries, the research team could not find any systematic patterns of 
actual openness of policy networks towards civil society actors across the different local government 
traditions (Heinelt and Kübler 2005, 194–198). 
 Given the wide variation of metropolitan institutions even within the same country and the 
multitude of functional governance arrangements within one and the same city region, it becomes 
difficult to define specific criteria of democratic quality in an international comparative perspective. 
Kübler and Schwab (2007) have analyzed twenty schemes of area-wide policy coordination in five Swiss 
metropolitan areas in order to assess the democratic consequences of the shift from local government to 
metropolitan governance. The coordination schemes considered as ‘complex governance’ (ad-hoc 
horizontal interactions involving non-state actors and possibly supra-local authorities) showed to be 
superior in terms of inclusion as compared to the more traditional core-city decision making or multi-tier 
government, as associations and citizens were not only consulted but even empowered to co-decide. 
Simultaneously, the actors of these schemes were barely accountable to citizens, neither through 
elections or referenda, nor indirectly through actors elected at the second tier. With regard to the 
deliberative quality of governance, the authors find no evidence for a more deliberative or consensual 
decision making mode in new regionalist arrangements. In a very recent article Kübler (2012) turns to a 
comparison of four established metropolitan governments and finds that the political logics and 
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territorial interest representation in these bodies converged towards more consensual patterns of 
decision making, even if local and regional representation are characterized by majoritarian traits.  
The difficulty now is: how to compare assessments of network-based governance with 
governance where a metropolitan government has been implemented? Inclusion, accountability and 
deliberative quality take very different forms in these institutional settings. More fundamentally, while 
these three criteria may be useful as a general framework for assessing the democratic contributions of 
innovative, participatory and deliberative procedures (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007), they do not seem 
to fit to account for the central problem of democracy at the metropolitan scale. The central problem of 
democratic metropolitan governance, as I would pose it, is to secure advocacy of affected localities while 
at the same time ensuring capacity for collective action at the urban scale. Although the two aspects are 
in intertwined in reality, it is worth to consider them separately. 
 
Advocacy of affected localities. Given the dense networks of interdependencies in city regions, decisions 
and actions in one locality will likely affect other localities. In her model of regional democracy, Iris Young 
was particularly concerned about the exclusionary processes of racial and class residential segregation 
that contain disadvantages and preserve privilege: 
 
“Autonomous local jurisdictions exclude some people and activities through their use of 
zoning regulation; with their tax powers wealthy communities run high-quality schools 
and first-rate services while a neighbouring poorer municipality has a much lower tax 
base and need for more costly and complex service provision. The planning and 
development decisions of one jurisdictionally autonomous unit affect the investment 
patterns and atmosphere of many neighbouring communities who have no say in these 
decisions.” (Young 2000, 229) 
 
Young builds on O’Neill’s theory of the ‘scope of obligations of justice’ and contends that people 
in metropolitan regions have obligations of justice to one another “because their lives are intertwined in 
social, economic, and communicative relations that tie their fates” (Young 2000, 233). While she 
acknowledges legitimate desires for differentiated affiliation and self-determination at the 
neighbourhood and local level, regional governance institutions need to simultaneously assure that local 
governments “take the interests of others in the region into account, especially where outsiders make a 
claim on them that they are affected by the actions and policies of that locale” (Young 2000, 233).  
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Young considers that the groups differentiated by culture or lifestyle should be represented in 
wider regional institutions which would be complemented by fora where such local or cross-local groups 
meet for public discussion about region-wide concern (Young 2000, 234). Theories of public choice have 
analyzed such interlocal conflicts of interests in terms of positive and negative externalities that lead to 
collective inefficiencies. Instead of metropolitan institutions of representation and deliberation, public 
choice theorists view interlocal negotiation for internalizing these externalities as more efficient than 
central state intervention that would ignore local preferences. A more critical rational choice account has 
been given by Richard Feiock (2009), who classified different tools of regional governance in a spectrum 
from consolidated regional authority, over inter-local contract networks to informal policy networks. 
While he observes that municipalities do selectively cooperate on some issues, he also notes the limits of 
self-organized cooperation in redistributive questions where the externality producer has a dominant 
bargaining position. Moreover, he explicates how the transaction costs involved in self-organized 
coordination critically depend on contextual factors such as state-level rules, the ease of measurement 
and monitoring of a particular good, demographic homogeneity across institutional units, and internal 
political structures. 
 
Capacity for collective action. Even though are faced with interdependence on a global scale, dealing 
with these problems is being hindered where democracy is understood as a theory of resistance, and not 
as a theory of collective action. Jane Mansbridge (2012) observes that liberal democratic theory has been 
primarily concerned in separating and limiting powers in order to protect individual liberty. While radical 
traditions of democracy call for common action, this common action is often conceived as in opposition 
to representative government. According to Mansbridge a ‘democratic theory of action’ would need to 
take problems of collective action more seriously and strengthen the capacity of representatives to 
negotiate and enforce policies promoting public goods. 
The concern for capacity for collective action is particularly pressing for city regions. Savitch and 
Kantor (2002) give an account of the political economy of globally competing cities. Vertical and 
horizontal intergovernmental support is conceived as a central structural precondition for effectively 
promoting integrated plans and strategies for the production of public goods such as infrastructure, 
environmental protection and equitable public services at an urban scale. Rivaling municipalities in 
fractionalized city regions, in contrast, dispose of a weak bargaining position towards businesses and 
developers and engage in a down to the bottom race with regard to taxes and the provision of public 
services. The concern of collective action thus goes beyond the internalization of externalities and the 
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voice of local needs described above, but also beyond the economies of scale gained through a 
regionalized production of public goods (or contract networks), usually discussed in the economic 
literature on metropolitan governance (e.g. Feiock 2009).  
3. The Comparative Framework for Democratic Urban Governance 
In the concluding chapter of the second edition of Theories of Urban Politics (2009), Clarence Stone calls 
for a research agenda which addresses the international challenge of comparative urban governance less 
in terms of political outcomes and more in terms of genuinely democratic ideals. The proposed 
comparative framework builds on broad theories of urban politics and proposes a set of normative 
democratic criteria which can be applied to three levels of urban governance, i.e. participatory 
processes, local government and metropolitan governance. Figure 1 gives an overview of the framework 
deduced in the preceding sections. 
The proposed framework for assessing democratic quality is innovative in several ways. Firstly, 
the layered approach to these three levels of governance allows for a more differentiated account of the 
complex processes of urban governance. Second, it makes a clear distinction between formal democratic 
institutions (left hand side of the figure), and their democratic outcomes (right hand side). While broader 
measures of democracy often conflate indicators of formal institutions (‘rules in form’) with indicators of 
democratic outcomes (‘rules in practice’), the framework proposed here does not rely on the manifold 
assumptions implied when assigning formal institutions different degrees of democratic qualities. 
Instead the causal arrows between institutional designs and democratic outcomes remain to be 
empirically investigated, where democratic outcomes might also be promoted by particular institutional 
arrangements or the local political culture. This means, thirdly, that the democratic outcomes must be 
assessed by looking at actual political processes taking place within more or less formalized institutions, 
from closed negotiations in policy networks over justifications by political leaders to interlocal 
negotiations and metropolitan capacity building. Forth, we must consider that processes of different 
policy fields are usually shaped by different institutional arrangements and characterized by different 
degrees of democratic outcomes. A city region might therefore be governed very democratically with 
regard to the provision of school and health services, while being highly exclusionary with regard to 
social services and urban planning. At the aggregate level, however, democratic urban governance will 
have to secure the overall coordination and prioritizing across policy fields, as decisions in one policy 
field often affect the options and outcomes in other policy fields.  
  
Figure 1: Comparative framework for the assessment of democratic urban governance 
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4. Outlook 
The framework presented here is a first draft aiming at taking an encompassing view on what democracy 
might mean at the urban scale. While the existing institutional typologies and newer democratic theories 
of democratic governance will serve as a starting point, the overall project of assessing democratic urban 
governance will need to refine and systematize the proposed institutional framework, and the 
considerations on the democratic outcomes need to be integrated into a more coherent theory of urban 
democracy. 
But even a more elaborated framework must remain provisional, as long as it is not tested for its 
usefulness in international comparisons. In a first step, I am planning a comparative study on the case of 
urban planning in the prosperous cities of Vancouver, Lyon, Stuttgart and Zurich, each disposing of a 
different state tradition. Urban planning is chosen as all four cities are face with common challenges of 
urban growth and as the vertical distribution of competencies of urban planning are less dependent on 
the state traditions, making a first test of the comparative framework more feasible. 
While the four cities share important socioeconomic conditions, they depart from very different 
state traditions. The institutional variation is best illustrated by the cities of Zurich and Vancouver. When 
compared internationally, Zurich clearly exhibits very direct democratic characteristics, combined with a 
strong separation of powers between a collegial government heading the administrative departments, a 
parliament counting 125 councilors, and rigorous judicial review. Vancouver in contrast corresponds to a 
North American prototype of local government: Mayor-council system, city manager with executive 
powers and at-large elections, not of parties but groups. While in Zurich the government council 
meetings are closed to the public, the meetings of the city council include the mayor and are publicly 
broadcasted. A remarkable democratic process in Vancouver was the creation of an Electoral Reform 
Commission that held 17 public forums in neighborhoods to discuss whether at-large elections should be 
replaced by a ward system. This process was concluded by a popular vote in 2004, deciding to keep the 
at-large system. Although Vancouver involved communities at neighborhood level to create ‘Community 
Visions’ for the future, it is difficult to assess from the outset whether such democratic innovations are 
more advanced than the open forums and sounding undertaken by the administration of Zurich, or 
whether the pro-growth regime found in Zurich (Crivelli and Dlabac 2006) has an equivalent in 
Vancouver as well. 
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With regard to institutions of metropolitan governance both cities lack the consolidated 
metropolitan institutions found in Lyon and Stuttgart (see Kübler 2012). While the other metropolitan 
regions in Canada have established metropolitan governments, Vancouver relies on a metropolitan 
governance body created in 1967, pursuing some mandated and some voluntary functions from the 
province of British Columbia. This arrangement is particularly involved in regional growth planning and 
public mass transportation (TransLink), yet some obervers argue that this flexible arrangement based on 
consensus decision making has reached its limits (P. J. Smith and Oberlander 2006). We find even more 
institutional fragmentation in the Greater Zurich Area (132 communes), were metropolitan governance 
is pursued through purpose-oriented coordination schemes (Kübler and Schwab 2007), e.g. for mass 
transit (majority votes), tax equalization schemes imposed by the regional government, water provision 
by the central municipality (majority voting confined to central city) or services for drug users (consensus 
decision making). 
I will derive global qualitative assessments of democratic outcomes for the 1970s and for the 
present, using the process-tracing method to relate the democratic outcomes to different institutional 
arrangements and their particular design. Wherever possible the comparative analysis will include 
quantifiable measures of democratic outcomes and institutional variation. Possible data sources for 
assessing these democratic dimensions comprehend: Comparative data on laws and institutions, party 
competition, political participation; data on elections and direct legislation; content analysis of media 
coverage; survey data; and expert interviews. While the qualitative case descriptions will help to critically 
test the developed comparative framework on its conceptual adequacy, the aim of the final phase is to 
specify a measurement instrument of democratic urban governance based on reliable indicators for 
institutional arrangements and democratic outcomes that can easily be assembled for a broad range of 
Western cities.  
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